The financial crisis provides a natural experiment for testing theoretical predictions of the equity underwriter's role following an initial public offering. Clients of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Wachovia saw their stock prices fall almost 5 percent, on average, on the day it appeared that these institutions might collapse. Representing a loss in equity value of almost $3 billion, the decline was more than 2 percent lower than the abnormal return predicted of other newly public companies. The price impact was worse for companies with fewer monitors, suggesting that underwriters play an important role in monitoring newly public companies. There is no evidence that the abnormal price decrease was related to the role of the underwriter as market maker, lender, or counterparty to investors.
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Introduction
When a firm goes public, it can expect to pay its underwriters high fees to sell its stock at a low price. 1 Theoretical explanations for high underwriting fees are based on the underwriter's reputation asset allowing banks to certify new issues (e.g. Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Carter and Manaster (1990) ). Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) extend this literature by proposing underwriters will monitor clients after the initial public offering (IPO) in order to protect their underwriting reputation asset. However, it is difficult to test for post-IPO monitoring, because it is closely linked to pre-IPO certification, hard to quantify, and because underwriter choice is endogenous. clients of troubled underwriters fell by almost 5% when it appeared that their IPO underwriter might collapse. The single day conditional return predicted by a market model was almost 2% lower for troubled underwriter clients than was the abnormal return of other newly public companies. This negative abnormal return represents almost $3 billion in lost equity value, on average, and more than 20% of the total initial underwriting spread. This result is consistent with Fernando, May and Megginson (2010) who find that the only clients affected by Lehman's failure were equity underwriting 1 Jenkinson and Ljungvist (2001) cover aspects of IPOs in detail. Specifically, Chen and Ritter (2000) document spreads of 7% for equity offerings and Hansen (2001) finds evidence for 7% as an efficiently contracted price. Ritter (2003) tabulates initial returns ranging from 6.3% to 256.9% for 38 countries and of 18.4% in the US. 2 clients and with Suzuki (1999) who finds that Japanese companies issue secondary offerings at lower prices when their underwriter has loan problems.
Clients' underperformance is related to the importance of underwriter monitoring.
Abnormal returns were less negative for clients with other monitors such as institutional investors or large blockholders. Abnormal returns were also less negative for clients the longer the time elapsed since the client's last equity issuance. This is consistent with the theoretical model of Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) . Post-IPO monitoring is more than just equity analyst coverage, because companies with analyst coverage but not underwritten by these troubled investment banks do not underperform by as much.
The amount of underperformance also is associated with some proxies for clients' dependence on equity financing. Event day returns are less negative for companies with more cash. This finding is similar to James (1992) who proposed that underwriters possess relationship-specific information similar to that of commercial banks and auditors.
While the loss of a lender is associated negatively with event day returns, negative abnormal returns for clients of failed underwriters are not driven by the loss of a relationship bank lender. The finding of negative abnormal returns for clients of troubled underwriters is also robust to controls for other bank functions such as investing and market making. Finally, while Aragon and Strahan (2010) find reduced liquidity for investments of hedge funds that had Lehman Brothers as their prime brokers, the negative abnormal returns are not driven by companies invested in by prime brokerage clients of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns.
If negative event day returns reflect investors' reassessment of quality due to underwriters' distress, there should be no positive price impact from the resolution of this distress. While it appeared on the event dates that Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Wachovia might cease operations, each equity underwriter subsequently was acquired. Client firms' abnormal returns were more than 2% higher than those of other newly public companies, on average, in the days following the acquisition of their troubled underwriters. This positive post-event return provides support for the assumption that the events were exogenous to the banks' underwriting business. It also suggests that the measured negative event date returns were not the result of investor updating on underwriter quality. This paper adds to the literature on the role of investment banks as financial intermediaries. It provides an empirical estimate of the post-IPO importance of equity underwriters. Fernando, May and Megginson's (2010) contemporaneous paper finds that the only type of clients affected by Lehman Brothers' failure are equity underwriting clients. This paper provides evidence for why equity underwriters are so important to their clients. In addition, it sheds light on the financial crisis, looking at the potential impact of weakness in the investment banking industry on investment banking clients. If investment banks are too weak to commit credibly to monitor post-IPO companies, access to equity finance may be negatively impacted. The analysis also has implications for companies selecting an underwriter -IPO clients should consider the financial strength of their underwriter, not just the bank's underwriting capabilities.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The literature and empirical predictions are in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 the methodology and Section 5 presents the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
Literature and Empirical Predictions
Do underwriters matter?
Does the exogenous near-failure of an equity underwriter affect the equity value of its clients? If the underwriter plays no special role for its post-IPO clients, there should be no impact on its clients' stock prices. The first empirical exercise is to document negative abnormal returns for troubled underwriters' clients.
Monitoring
Many studies highlight the importance of the equity underwriter in certifying clients, especially for initial public offerings. Easterbrook described the importance of underwriter monitoring of the manager-stockholder conflict: "When it issues new securities, the Company's affairs will be reviewed by an investment banker or some similar intermediary…" (Easterbrook (1984, p. 654) ). Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the underpricing equilibrium is enforced by investment bankers who have reputation capital at stake. Carter and Manaster (1990) model the importance of exogenously determined underwriter reputation and show that underwriter prestige is negatively related to the magnitude and variance of post-IPO price run-up.
Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) extend these papers to a model where the certification role of underwriters mandates post-IPO monitoring. They theorize that banks receive rents from their reputations for monitoring, and that banks continue to 5 monitor since shirking would be unlikely to result in gains that offset the losses to reputational capital. Investment banks thus produce information about companies after they are public because they want to protect their reputation capital. This post-IPO monitoring would be discontinued if the value of the rents from that reputation went away, for example if the underwriter went bankrupt or if its IPO underwriting business was discontinued.
It is not necessary for the underwriter to possess non-transferable private information for its post-IPO monitoring to be valuable; it is only necessary that the underwriter be motivated to invest in information production to protect its reputation.
Kelly and Ljungvist (2010) outline an asymmetric-information asset pricing model in which share prices and uninformed investors' demands fall as information asymmetry increases. In this model, the prospect for reduced information production by troubled underwriters should result in lower client stock prices.
Testing for post-IPO monitoring by underwriters is subject to concerns about endogeneity of company characteristics and underwriter selection, which might produce the observed positive relationship between underwriter reputation and post-IPO stock performance. It is also hard to empirically separate pre-IPO certification from post-IPO monitoring because pre-and post-IPO monitoring and information production should be very similar. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) Practitioners also say that there is an exchange of information between analysts, investment bankers and the equity sales force / traders. Equity salespeople speak with investors about their investments and seek information on companies from analysts and bankers.
A factor which would bias against finding any results in the context of underwriter failures is that the reputation asset may be at the level of the senior 8 investment bankers who worked on the underwriting rather than at the underwriter level.
This monitoring might be portable even in the wake of an underwriter's collapse.
Unfortunately, there is no publicly available information on the extent or value of underwriter interactions with clients. Post-IPO monitoring is likely to involve similar skills and information production by the investment banks as did pre-IPO certification.
Regardless of the mechanism, a monitoring explanation for the importance of the underwriter results in the following prediction: 
Relationship Underwriting
In addition to acting as a post-IPO monitor, underwriters may possess valuable relationship-specific information that cannot be transferred easily. James (1992) 
Other Bank Functions
The finding of negative abnormal returns is necessary but not sufficient evidence to prove the existence of a special post-IPO role for underwriters. Underwriters are part larger banks which may also lenders, market makers, or investors in underwriting clients.
The larger bank may be a prime broker or counterparty to hedge funds which are likely to invest in the bank's underwriting clients and may also be forced to sell stocks when the bank becomes distressed. The prospective loss of these services or the indirect impact from bank counterparties who are investors, rather than the loss of underwriter monitoring, may be the source of the observed negative returns.
The first alternative explanation is that the prospective loss of a lending relationship causes negative abnormal returns. The importance of bank relationships is 10 considered extensively in the literature.
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If underwriters are the primary lenders for their clients, the loss of a lending relationship would result in a negative equity return. A second explanation is that the underwriter is a market maker for its clients. As
Stoll (2003) The analysis uses book underwriter rather than lead underwriter or member of the underwriting syndicate, because book managers sell the largest proportion of the offering and receive the highest percentage of the commissions, and in order to maximize sample size without adding too much noise. The troubled underwriter was the lead manager of more than half of the companies for which it served as a book underwriter. The finding of negative abnormal returns is robust to using only companies where the troubled underwriter was the lead and to 4 and 6 year sample selection windows. IPOs on these dates.
[TABLE 1]
Jain and Kini (1999) find that clients of higher ranked underwriters have better post-IPO returns. The four banks studied were relatively highly ranked in equity underwriting, thus the sample may be expected to be of slightly higher quality than a 15 random sample of IPOs.
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If the TUW clients are of higher quality than other newly public companies that would bias against finding any negative abnormal returns if higher quality companies perform better on market crisis days. Regardless, the mean valuation (measured by the price to earnings ratio or book to market) of the TUW clients is not significantly different from other newly public companies, suggesting that these companies may not necessarily be of higher quality.
Event dates
The analysis is based on four events, collectively referred to as "failures. The analysis is also robust to longer estimation periods and to including days -1 through -5 in the estimation period, although the estimation period is necessarily limited by the fact that the companies of interest are newly public.
The basic specification is:
where AR i,t is the abnormal return of company i at the event date t and FAIL i,t is a dummy variable equal to one if company i's book underwriter failed at date t. α measures the extent of the underperformance of all newly public companies on the event dates, while β measures incremental underperformance of the clients of troubled underwriters.
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FAIL t is subscripted with t because it is equal to one only for companies with an underwriter failure on that date. Thus companies underwritten by Lehman and Merrill are part of the control group March 14 th (FAIL 3/14/08 =0) but not on September 15 th (FAIL 9/15/08 =1). The eight companies underwritten by both Lehman and Merrill are 9 Expanding the event window to include -1 and 0 results in a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -0.7% vs. the DGTW characteristics model and -2.8% vs. the Fama French three-factor model. Expanding the event window to include -1, 0 and +1 results in a CAR of -1.5% vs. the DGTW characteristics model and -2.5% vs. the three-factor model. Expanding the event window to include -2, -1 and 0 results in a CAR of -1.2% vs. the DGTW characteristics model and -3.9% vs. the three-factor model. In each case the difference between the CAR and 0 is statistically significant. 10 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for the suggestion of this approach which allows for the separation of the estimation of the impact of the events on all newly public companies and the impact of the underwriter's failure. 11 Factors are created using the Fama-French methodology. The three factors are market return, SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low), with data from: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 12 Created by assigning each company to one of 125 portfolios, based on methodology described in Wermers (2004) and Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , but excluding banks. The 125 portfolios are based on quintiles of market capitalization, industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio and momentum (return over the last 12 months), determined as of June 30 th of each year. The company is assigned to each portfolio using the breakpoints given by: http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/dgtw/coverpage.htm.
4.2.Difference-in-differences
After establishing that newly public companies underperform on the date of their underwriter's distress, the remaining analysis explores the relationship between characteristics of clients and the event day fall in their stock prices. The equation estimated becomes:
where AR i,t is the abnormal return of company i at the event date t and FAIL i,t is a dummy variable equal to one if company i's book underwriter failed at date t. α is the fixed effect of the failure on the newly public companies and X i,t-1 is a proxy for the characteristic of interest from the accounting period immediately prior to the event date. δ measures how important that characteristic is for all newly public companies on the event date, and η measures whether that characteristic is differentially important for firms whose underwriter fails. The specification thus calculates the importance of newly public company characteristics on the event dates. Then, by looking at the interaction of these characteristics and underwriter failure, we can estimate whether these factors matter more to companies with failed underwriters.
The estimations in the remainder of the paper present abnormal returns calculated relative to the DGTW characteristics model (DGTW) and to the appropriate market index. The DGTW characteristics model is used because it captures important differences between the companies that might be important on these dates. Results are similar if other benchmarks such as the Fama-French three factor model or a simple market model are used.
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Empirical Results
Event date returns
Prices of newly public companies fall on the day that it is revealed that their underwriter may cease operation. Table 2 summarizes the stock market return for companies whose underwriters failed leading up to the event date. Mean daily returns of troubled underwriters' clients were lower than those of almost every benchmark on the event date and the three preceding days.
[TABLE 2]
The negative event date returns are not driven by severe underperformance of a single underwriter's clients. Table 3 tabulates event date abnormal returns by underwriter. On average and at the median, the sample companies underperformed relative to the conditional expected return, except for those underwritten by Wachovia.
Lehman-underwritten companies had the lowest abnormal returns, perhaps because Lehman's failure was unconditionally the worst. (VCFIRM x FAIL) should be positively associated with abnormal returns.
[TABLE 3]
The top half of Table 5 shows the results of specifications testing the relationship between these proxies and event day abnormal returns. The greater the time since last issue, the less negative were abnormal returns. The scale of the estimated coefficient suggests that 5.7 years after a company's last equity issuance, failure of its underwriter no longer matters. It is interesting to note that the sign of the coefficient on the interaction of LISSUETIME and FAIL was different from the sign of the coefficient on LISSUETIME. While the underperformance of clients of troubled underwriters is mitigated by time since last issue, in general, companies that issued equity less recently actually underperformed on the event dates. information that is directly dispersed to the market, reducing the relative importance of the underwriter as an information provider. Finally, institutional shareholders and blockholders may be more likely to be long term investors and thus be less likely to sell into a sudden overall market decline, even if they are ultimately planning to exit a stock due to the prospects for reduced underwriter monitoring.
In addition, event day abnormal returns are more negative when the company's operations are more opaque, for example when analysts' estimates for the company are more dispersed, although the results are not statistically significant. The sign of the coefficients was not as predicted for the number of other book underwriters although the estimates were not statistically significant. This may reflect the fact that companies for whom monitoring is more important may also have more underwriters.
[ I estimate abnormal returns for 1,393 companies with recent analyst research coverage from the four troubled underwriters (2,044 observations). I add a control for whether the analyst is top-ranked by Institutional Investor magazine (All-star analysts).
These top ranked analysts are more likely to get positions at other banks even if their own institution fails, and thus any information should not be lost even if the underwriter failed.
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Abnormal event day returns for companies covered by troubled underwriters'
analysts ranged from -1.2% to +0.26% and varied in statistical significance depending on the market benchmark against which the conditional return was estimated. For each market benchmark, the estimated abnormal return for companies underwritten by 13 I am grateful to Alexander Ljungqvist and Felicia Marston for their help in compiling the Institutional Investor data.
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troubled investment banks was significantly lower than that of companies that had only analyst coverage from troubled investment banks. This result suggests either that the research analyst does differentially more monitoring of newly public companies that were underwritten by an affiliated investment bank or that the research analyst is not the sole monitoring agent. As expected, in most specifications, the negative effect of failure is mitigated if the analyst is top-ranked by Institutional Investor magazine.
[ 
Relationship Underwriting
Companies that are equity dependent should also be affected by the loss of their Results on equity dependence are mixed. Specifications (9), (13) and (14) of Table 5 do not support Prediction 2. There is no consistent statistically significant relationship between equity dependence and TUW clients' abnormal returns. This may either reflect noise in the measure of equity dependence or that underwriters do not 14 The equity dependence measure is: KZ it = 1.002(CFit/Ait-1) -39.367(DIVit/Ait-1) -1.315(Cit/Ait-1) + 3.319(LEVit) + 0.283(Qit) where CFit/Ait-1 is cash flow (the sum of OIBDPQ for the 12 months trailing the event date) over lagged assets (ATQ); DIVit/Ait-1 is cash dividends (DV) over assets; Cit/Ait-1 is cash balances (CHEQ) over assets; LEVit is leverage ((DLCQ+DLTTQ)/assets); and Qit is the market value of equity (price (PRCCQ) times shares outstanding (CSHOQ)) plus assets minus the book value of equity (SEQQ +TXDITCQ-PSTKQ) all over assets. All items are calculated as of the last fiscal quarter end prior to the event date.
possess valuable non-transferrable information. Only cash-to-capital is statistically significant, suggesting that underwriters may not be as important for companies with higher cash reserves. In theory, both cash-to-capital and dividends-to-capital should have the same sign, since both would indicate that the company should not need to access equity capital markets in the near future. To the extent that both measure equity dependence, dividends seem more likely to be associated with a lack of equity dependence, since paying cash dividends suggests that a company is not conserving cash, while companies with a lot of cash may have high investment needs.
Alternative Bank Functions
If the underwriter provides other services to its clients such as lending, market making and investing, the negative event day abnormal returns may arise from the loss of those services. In summary, Troubled Bank was Market Maker is equal to 1 for Nasdaq companies when the underwriter had an inside quote and for NYSE/AMEX companies when the underwriter was a specialist. By this definition, the troubled underwriter was a market maker for 24% of their clients and 12% of other newly public companies.
The relationship between underwriter distress and negative returns is robust to controlling for the underwriter's role as a market maker (specification (2) , and Bear Wagner was not a specialist for the company, the dummy variable will be equal to 1 for Lehman's underwriting clients. This effectively assumes that no companies had both Lehman and Bear Wagner as specialists. The analysis is robust to relaxing this assumption. 19 In addition, abnormal returns were estimated for an additional 543 companies for which Lehman and Bear Stearns served as NYSE specialists but not as an IPO underwriter. The average abnormal return calculated relative to the NYSE benchmark was not statistically different from zero. This is significantly Similar to Aragon and Strahan's higher than the -1% abnormal return for the 43 NYSE/AMEX companies for which Lehman and Bear Stearns served as NYSE specialists and underwriters. This difference is complementary evidence that the underwriters' market making functions were not the primary drivers of the negative event date returns. This may be either because specialists are not important or because market participants assumed that the underwriters' specialist functions would continue regardless of the outcome for the investment bank. 20 If a company is not in the Spectrum database, the underwriter holding is assumed to be 0. 21 This result is robust to alternative specifications such as using only a dummy indicating if the underwriter holds any shares (UDUMMY). 22 I am grateful to George Aragon and Philip Strahan for sharing their hand collected dataset with me.
32 results on price impact, there is no statistically significant relationship between shares held by hedge funds with troubled prime brokers and abnormal returns (specification (4)).
The observed TUW client underperformance is not driven by stocks held by hedge fund clients of the troubled banks.
Combined analysis
The relationship between underwriter monitoring and negative event returns is revisited to combine controls for other investment bank functions with the monitoring proxies that were statistically significant in the previous analysis. Specifications (5) through (8) of Table 7 include the log of days since last issue, institutional ownership, blocksize and cash to capital, and the interactions of these variables with FAIL.
Estimated relationships are consistent with previous results -other monitors continue to mitigate the negative abnormal return for clients of failed underwriters. The estimated coefficients remain statistically significant only for institutional investor ownership and days since last equity issue. Cash to capital also remains an important mitigating factor.
Ex Post Updating
The preceding cross-sectional analysis assumes a post-IPO role for the underwriter, be it information-based or not. Another alternative (Alternative 5) is that underwriters' distress caused investors to update their beliefs negatively about the quality of the underwriters' clients. If this is the cause of the negative event date returns, there should be no price impact when it is revealed that the underwriters will continue. This 33 proposition can be tested by examining the post-event cumulative abnormal returns (POSTCAR) for 3 days following the event, t = +3 through +5.
The test of the proposition that post-event cumulative abnormal returns are equal to zero is estimated as:
where POSTCAR i,t+3 to t+5 is the sum of daily abnormal returns of company i from t+3 through t+5 and FAIL i,t is a dummy variable equal to one if company i's book underwriter failed at date t. α measures the post event performance of all newly public companies on the event dates, while β measures performance of the clients of troubled underwriters.
As shown in Table 8 , regardless of the benchmark, once it is revealed that the investment banks will continue operations in some format, companies have positive abnormal returns and appear to earn back the negative event day returns. Post event abnormal returns of TUW clients are significantly negatively correlated with event day abnormal returns (i.e. clients with high negative event date abnormal returns experience high positive post-event returns), suggesting that the reversal is driven by the resolution of the underwriter's distress.
[TABLE 8]
Conclusion
For at least one day in 2008, the market believed that Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Wachovia might no longer be in business the following day.
These "failures" were exogenous to the banks' equity underwriting operations, and thus offer a natural experiment to estimate the impact of the loss of an equity underwriter. On average, companies recently taken public by these banks suffered an abnormal decline in equity value more than 2% lower than that of other newly public companies, a total loss of almost $3 billion or 20% of the gross spread earned on the initial public offerings.
This negative abnormal return implies that investment banks are important to their clients even after the IPO, and provides empirical support for theoretical models that predict monitoring based on the importance of investment bank reputation (including Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) ). This paper presents evidence that investment banks are important because they monitor their post-IPO clients. Low abnormal returns for clients of troubled underwriters were mitigated when companies had more alternative monitors. These negative abnormal returns were not driven by the underwriters' function as a lender, market maker, investor or counterparty to investors. Despite initial uncertainty, the operations of all four underwriters were acquired by other banks and their underwriting function continued. Once it was known that banks' monitoring and information production function would be continued, their clients' abnormal price decline was reversed.
While none of these investment banks have ceased underwriting, these findings have important implications for future investment banking clients and investors in initial public offerings. These stakeholders should carefully evaluate the financial health of the underwriter's entire business, not just its underwriting skills. Uncertainty about the overall health of underwriters may reduce access to equity capital markets if underwriters can no longer credibly execute their certification and monitoring role because investors fear that the underwriter may not be around to monitor the newly public company.
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SAMPLE AND IPO INDEX, BY EVENT DATE
The sample consists of 213 newly public companies with an IPO from 2004 to 2007 for which the failed underwriter was a book underwriter (TUW Clients) and 370 newly public companies that did not have a failed underwriter as their book underwriter or co-manager (Other IPOs) at each of the three fail dates for a total of 1,679 company-event day observations. Accounting and ownership variables are measured as of the fiscal quarter preceding the event date, price variables are measured as of 5 days prior to the event date, and market making variables are measured as of December 31, 2007. The earliest event date is used in cases of the same company underwritten by multiple failed underwriters. The statistics for Company Descriptors, Monitoring, and Equity Dependence are estimated using a sample of one observation per company. The statistics for Other Underwriter Functions are estimated using one observation per company-event date.
TUW Clients
Other The sample consists of 141 companies (149 observations) that were covered by the failed underwriter that underwrote them and 1252 companies (1895 observations) that were covered by the analysts of the failed underwriter, but were not underwritten by the failed underwriter in their last equity issue. Fail is a dummy variable equal to one if the company's book underwriter failed at date t. Ranked is a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst covering the company was ranked by Institutional Investor Magazine. The dependent variable is Abnormal return, the difference on the event day (t = 0) between the actual event day return and the conditional expected return calculated based on the listed benchmarks. Abnormal returns are calculated relative to the following benchmarks: The S&P 500, NASDAQ Composite and NYSE indexes. The Matched Exchange Adjusted benchmark compares each company's return to the return of the index where it is listed (either NASDAQ or NYSE). The three factor model is the Fama-French three factor model, with the return of the index where the company is listed (either NASDAQ or NYSE) as the market measure. The DGTW benchmark is created using the DGTW (1993) methodology. The SIC matched portfolio return is generated by value weighting all public companies in the same two-digit SIC code as each sample company. Statistics calculated with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate t-statistic is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample consists of 213 newly public companies with an IPO from 2004 to 2007 for which the failed underwriter was a book underwriter and 370 newly public companies that did not have a failed underwriter as their book underwriter or co-manager at each of the three fail dates for a total of 1679 possible company-event day observations. The dependent variable is Abnormal return, the difference on the event day (t = 0) between the actual event day return and the conditional expected return calculated based on the DGTW characteristics model. 
POST EVENT DATE ABNORMAL RETURNS
The sample consists of 213 newly public companies with an IPO from 2004 to 2007 for which the failed underwriter was a book underwriter and 370 newly public companies that did not have a failed underwriter as their book underwriter or co-manager at each of the three fail dates for a total of 1679 company-event day observations. The dependent variable is Abnormal return, the cumulative difference on days t = +3 to +5 between the actual event day return and the conditional expected return calculated based on the listed benchmarks. Fail is a dummy variable equal to one if the company's book underwriter failed at date t. Abnormal returns are calculated relative to the following benchmarks:
The S&P 500, NASDAQ Composite and NYSE indexes. The Matched Exchange benchmark compares each company's return to the return of the index where it is listed (either NASDAQ or NYSE). The three factor model is the Fama-French three factor model, with the return of the index where the company is listed (either NASDAQ or NYSE) as the market measure. The DGTW benchmark is created using the DGTW (1993) methodology. The SIC matched portfolio return is generated by value weighting all public companies in the same two-digit SIC code as each sample company. Statistics calculated with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate t-statistic is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
